Putin has no need to end the war in Ukraine - and this is why

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Putin has no need to end the war in Ukraine - and this is why

As the war in Ukraine marks its third anniversary, Donald Trump’s dash for peace has gifted Vladimir Putin the perfect opportunity to negotiate his way to victory.

Trump has shown that he is ready to make far-reaching concessions over the heads of Ukraine and its European allies.

The administration’s position – that Nato membership for Ukraine is off the table, and that there will be no American boots on the ground to police a peace settlement – is music to Kremlin ears.

Trump is also happy to repeat Russian falsehoods about Ukraine and to support its attacks on its beleaguered president, Volodymyr Zelensky.

Yet how sure can Putin be that Trump will in the end deliver a deal that achieves his goal of emasculating Ukraine’s independence and preventing it from leaving Russia’s sphere of influence?

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has indicated that Russia will have to make compromises. Pete Hegseth, the Secretary of Defence, has spoken of the need for any peace settlement to be backed by robust security guarantees for Ukraine.

If he wanted to, Trump could put pressure on Putin by threatening to displace Russian oil from international markets and continuing to arm Ukraine.

During his 25 years in power, Putin has never encountered a Western leader like Trump. The US President has the psychology and skills of a businessman – as well as the experience of a New York property developer in dealing with organised crime bosses like Putin.

Putin might feel sure that he can gratify Trump’s ego. Yet he can be less sure that the US President will give him carte blanche to dismantle Ukraine as an independent country. Trump wants to project strength to other world leaders.

For this reason, completely surrendering Ukraine is not an option for Trump. But addressing the root causes of the war and forging a peace settlement that excludes US boots on the ground are mission impossible for as long as Putin is in power.

This makes a ceasefire a more likely outcome of a negotiation – particularly if Putin concludes that the quicker route to Ukrainian surrender is allowing the country to hold parliamentary and presidential elections, which have not taken place because of martial law.

This would require a ceasefire to last several months and would give the Russian army time to re-group.

And the political tensions in an election campaign, in a country so scarred by war, could create divisions in Ukrainian society that would make it harder to resist another Russian onslaught.

Over the past three years, Ukrainian and Western hopes that the costs of war for Russia would persuade Putin to change course have proved futile – and are set to remain so.

For now, Russia’s economic situation is challenging but not threatening. If the country can continue to sell oil in sufficient quantities, it can sustain the war effort despite high inflation and the degradation of its high-tech sector under the pressure of sanctions.

The army has learned important lessons in Ukraine and continues to slowly advance in Donbas despite huge losses of men and equipment. Manpower is becoming more of an issue as recruitment levels drop, but the problem is far from acute.

Russia’s military industry has proved adept at re-conditioning 60s equipment stored since Soviet days, while also developing modern drone technologies.

Putin’s regime wobbled for a moment in June 2023 when elements of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s private army marched on Moscow.

Since then, it has stabilised and regular renewal of the state bureaucracy, including with war veterans, has brought renewed discipline and unity.

Putin probably has resources for another two years to continue fighting at current levels of intensity to try to force Ukraine into a surrender.

However, stocks of some old equipment are set to run out after the summer and the army may require more soldiers if it needs to control larger urban areas as it advances. This could require additional mobilisation that the Kremlin wants to avoid. The last partial mobilisation in 2022 led to close to one million people fleeing abroad.

The “slow cook” ceasefire is Putin’s most attractive option. It might also quickly bring about a relaxation of sanctions.

Ukrainians must still hope that other voices can make Trump understand that by stopping the shooting, he risks handing victory to Putin and undermining his “America First” narrative of peace through strength.

John Lough is a former Nato representative in Moscow and current Head of Foreign Policy at the New Eurasian Strategies Centre, a London-based think tank focused on Russia’s long-term future

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